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Tax Incentives and Sub-Saharan Africa 




The OECD’s Base Erosion Profit Shifting (BEPS) project has taken a 
powerful and welcome look at many of the tax avoidance strategies that 
proliferate in a world where multinational enterprises are in the business of 
exploiting gaps in the tax laws of different countries to minimize their ultimate 
tax bills.  The focus on international consensus and prescriptions for reform 
has not been an unqualified good for the nations in Sub-Saharan Africa, which 
find themselves in the position of reacting to standards and taking on 
compliance burdens set without sufficient consideration of their special 
circumstances.  Because the path for the BEPS project was chosen before 
receiving meaningful input from these nations, the initiatives offer little 
support for revenue-raising strategies for Sub-Saharan Africa and require an 
administrative infrastructure currently beyond the capacity of many nations 
in the region.  With an eye toward integrating achievement of the United 
Nations Sustainable Development Goals (2030) (SDGs) with the BEPS 
project, this article urges three reforms: implementation of treaty-based 
regional tax incentives mindful of the SDGs in the OECD’s Multilateral 
Instrument to Implement Tax Treaty Related Matters to Prevent BEPS; 
development of a fund by high-income countries to assist Sub-Saharan 
African nations in building tax administrative capacity; and reconsideration 
of some of the BEPS reform proposals, particularly the Digital Economy two-
pillar proposals, with the aim of according agency to Sub-Saharan Africa as 
 
  Theodore Rinehart, Professor of Business Law, George Washington University. (c), 2021.  All 
Rights Reserved.  This article is dedicated with much love to my mother, Marion B. Brown, who is 
responsible for any good thing I have done or achieved.  I would like to thank Ms. Lori Fossum, 
Reference Librarian at the George Washington University Law School, for awesome research 
assistance, and the organizers and participants at the Duke Tax Policy Seminar for very helpful 
comments and feedback.  I would also like to thank the members of the Pepperdine Caruso School of 
Law for amazing support, especially Ms. Mariana Orbay and Mr. Zachary Carstens.  Any errors found 
are solely those of the author. 
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it constructs a blueprint for solid emergence from economic hardship 
heightened by the pandemic. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
The economic viability of the poor economies of the developing world,1 
particularly sub-Saharan Africa, continues to be a secondary focus of the high-
income countries of the developed world as they move forward with projects 
to ensure international cooperation to combat tax avoidance and to harmonize 
the standards for evaluating the substantive integrity of national regimes.2  The 
2013 Base Erosion Profit Shifting (BEPS) project of the G20, coordinated and 
managed by the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development 
(OECD), has achieved an overhaul of tax standards, but that process did not 
place a sufficient emphasis on the particular concerns of the developing 
world.3  The OECD expressed concern and took action to include input from 
these nations, but this was near the end of the process of consensus formation.4  
By providing an opportunity for consultation, but only after the paradigms, 
dictates, and core principles were adopted in final reports issued in 2015, the 
developed world undermined meaningful input from Africa regarding the 
foundational principles of international tax reform. 
Almost in tandem with the OECD project, the United Nations (U.N.) was 
renewing, expanding, and strengthening sustainable development goals 
(SDGs) to be achieved by 2030.5  These SDGs address a range of issues 
deemed critical to the survival of populations residing in low-income 
countries.6  These include elimination of poverty and hunger, climate action, 
 
 1. The focus of this article is on sub-Saharan Africa, a region in which a majority of the member 
countries are ranked poor based on World Bank human development measures.  Global Economic 
Indicators – Statistics & Facts, STATISTA (2020). 
 2. Press Release, Economic and Social Council, International Cooperation to End Tax Crimes 
Crucial for Achieving Sustainable Growth Agenda, Speakers Say as Development Financing Forum 
Concludes, U.N. Press Release ECOSOC/6840 (May 25, 2017). 
 3. See International Collaboration to End Tax Avoidance, OECD, https://www.oecd.org/tax/ 
beps/ (last visited Feb. 21, 2021). 
 4. See, e.g., Carmel Peters, Developing Countries’ Reactions to the G20/OECD Action Plan on 
Base Erosion and Profit Shifting, BULL. FOR INT’L TAX’N 375, 375, 375 n.1 (2015), https://www. 
un.org/esa/ffd/wp-content/uploads/2015/10/11STM_G20OecdBeps.pdf. 
 5. See Transforming Our World: The 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, G.A. Res. 70/1, 
UNITED NATIONS 13–27 (Oct. 21, 2015), https://sdgs.un.org/2030agenda (last visited Feb. 12, 2021). 
 6. Id.  The initial set of goals, issued in 2012, were revisited in 2017.  Sha-Zukang (Under-
Secretary-General for Economic and Social Affairs), The Millennium Development Goals Report 
2012, 4–5 UNITED NATIONS (2012), https://www.un.org/millenniumgoals/pdf/MDG%20Report% 
202012.pdf.  The 2017 report launched 17 goals to “transform the world.”  Liu Zhenmin (Under-
Secretary-General for Economic and Social Affairs), The Sustainable Development Goals Report 
2020, 6–22 UNITED NATIONS (2020), https://unstats.un.org/sdgs/report/2020/The-Sustainable-
[Vol. 48: 995, 2021]  Tax Incentives and Sub-Saharan Africa 
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW 
999 
reduction of economic inequality, and private-governmental partnerships to 
achieve these ends.7  A consortium of private actors and not-for-profit 
institutions has committed to incorporating the SDGs into their corporate 
practices.8  The World Bank, the nongovernmental representative of the 
world’s richest countries, launched an initiative to advance the SDGs through 
its Human-Centered Business Model (HCBM), of which the OECD 
Development Centre became a sponsor.  The HCBM is supported by five 
pillars, including a Fiscal Pillar.9  The Fiscal Pillar Work Group has offered 
“taxation initiatives that will provide ways in which governments can use 
taxation policy to achieve a set of human-centered performance goals” which 
are informed by the SDGs.10  Key to the ability of low-income countries to 
attract investment essential to fund infrastructure needs of constituent 
populations is an international tax regime constructed with the aim of 
equipping them with the capacity to collect adequate revenue in a sustainable 
manner. 
From the initial stages, the BEPS project proceeded with a focus on the 
special concerns of high-income countries.  This is understandable given the 
membership of the OECD and the source of the mandate for reform (the 
G20).11  The existence of the separate tax regimes of developed nations, 
including the United States and most OECD members, has led multinationals 
to attempt to exploit gaps that allow minimization of tax liability in their 
resident countries or to shift profits to low-tax jurisdictions to escape or 
substantially reduce taxation.  The G20 initiated the BEPS project to avoid 
 
DevelopmentGoals-Report-2020.pdf [hereinafter SDGR 2020 Report]. 
 7. SDGR 2020 Report, supra note 6, at 6–7, 15, 18, 22. 
 8. See Our Strategic Priorities, B TEAM, https://bteam.org/strategy (last visited Feb. 21, 2021).  
The B Team, consisting of twenty-nine leaders of industry and the non-profit sector, has signed on to 
implementing the SDGs in the areas of climate change, gender equality, and governance.  See Leaders, 
B TEAM, https://bteam.org/who-we-are/leaders (last visited Feb. 21, 2021).  The Team’s commitment 
is to “encourage adoption of responsible corporate tax practice and advocacy for fair and effective tax 
systems that contribute to society and sustainable development.”  Governance, B TEAM, 
https://bteam.org/our-work/causes/governance (last visited Feb. 21, 2021); Tax and the United 
Nations Sustainable Development Goals, INT’L CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, iccwbo.org/content/ 
uploads/sites/3/2018/02/icc-position-paper-on-tax-and-the-un-sdgs.pdf (last visited Feb. 21, 2021). 
 9. See The Human-Centered Business Model, OECD, http://www.oecd.org/dev/human-centred-
business-model-hcbm.htm (last visited Feb. 12, 2021). 
 10. Karen B. Brown, Tax Policy: A Tool to Support Sustainable Growth (Pillar 4: Fiscal Matters) 
(World Bank) (2019). 
 11. See OECD, ACTION PLAN ON BASE EROSION AND PROFIT SHIFTING 11 (2013) [hereinafter AP 
ON BASE EROSION] (“The G20 finance ministers called on the OECD to develop an action plan to 
address BEPS issues in a co-ordinated and comprehensive manner.”). 
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revenue shortfalls caused by a wide variety of tax avoidance techniques that 
threaten to result in inadequate public funding to sustain infrastructure and a 
social safety network for residents.  The process resulted in fifteen primary 
recommendations for reform that invoked and continue to invoke controversy 
even among the instigators.12 
The emphasis on solutions tailored to the existing separate tax systems of 
high-income countries has resulted in prescriptions for reform that are 
sophisticated, complex, and costly to implement.  Solutions to the serious 
challenges posed by international tax avoidance, while welcome, are often not 
easily adapted to the circumstances of sub-Saharan nations.  BEPS solutions 
are not readily achieved by countries in that region. 
The advent of the 2019 pandemic places even greater pressure on high-
income countries to support a version of tax reform within the capacity of the 
developing world that addresses its needs.13  The U.N. has acknowledged that, 
even before COVID-19, efforts to meet the SDGs by 2030 were not on track.14  
Food insecurity, degradation of the environment, and high levels of inequality 
persisted throughout the world.  The pandemic has brought a challenge to the 
capacity of health systems, threatened the livelihood of half the global 
workforce, and returned tens of millions of people to poverty and hunger.15  
As a result, the need for revenue mobilization in the sub-Saharan region has 
become even more pronounced. 
A particular focus on sub-Saharan Africa is imperative.  According to the 
World Bank Group, because of the pandemic, sub-Saharan Africa is expected 
to enter its first recession in a quarter of a century.16  Economic activity there 
is expected to contract by 3.3%, with real gross domestic product returning to 
2007 levels.17  The Group suspects that COVID-19 could push 40 million 
 
 12. Mindy Herzfeld, The Case Against BEPS: Lessons for Tax Coordination, 21 FLA. TAX REV. 
1, 5 (2017). 
 13. See, e.g., The Impact of the Coronavirus (COVID-19) Crisis on Development Finance, OECD 
1, 11 (June 24, 2020), http://www.oecd.org/coronavirus/policy-responses/theimpact-of-the-
coronavirus-covid-19-crisis-on-development-finance-9de00b3b/. 
 14. See Amy Lieberman, SDGs Show Slow Progress, Not on Track to Reach 2030 Targets, UN 
Reports, DEVEX (June 22, 2018), https://www.devex.com/news/sdgs-show-slowprogress-not-on-
track-to-reach-2030-targets-un-reports-92971. 
 15. See SDGR Report 2020, supra note 6, at 2. 
 16. See World Bank Confirms Economic Downturn in Sub-Saharan Africa, Outlines Key Policies 
Needed for Recovery, WORLD BANK (Oct. 8, 2020), https://www.worldbank.org/en/news/press-
release/2020/10/08/world-bank-confirms-economic-downturn-in-sub-saharan-africa-outlines-key-
polices-needed-for-recovery [hereinafter World Bank Confirms Economic Downturn]. 
 17. Id. 
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people in the region into extreme poverty, erasing nearly five years of 
progress.18  Spillovers from the global recession brought on by the pandemic 
and the effects of domestic lockdowns have lowered growth levels, 
specifically by 6.1% in Nigeria and 17.1% in South Africa.19  Greatest 
declines are expected in East and Southern Africa, based on declines in output 
in South African and Angola.20  Most countries in the region are expected to 
emerge from the pandemic with historically large budget deficits, leaving 
severe debt challenges.21 
This article considers the origins of the BEPS project, which provides a 
significant and detailed look at a range of complex problems confronting the 
international tax system.  Modern ways of doing business (through e-
commerce and other mechanisms) gave rise to sophisticated tax avoidance 
devices that exploited an antiquated set of tax rules.22  The BEPS initiatives 
are defensive measures taken to prevent aggressive tax planning that exploits 
unanticipated advantages gained through manipulation of the differences in 
the laws of the separate countries in which multinational enterprises operate.  
BEPS and related projects have presented standards and imposed obligations, 
but they have addressed issues facing the sub-Saharan region primarily on the 
margins.  Tangential focus on sub-Saharan Africa came not out of animus, but 
out of initial choices about the direction of reform.  Subsequent efforts to 
address Africa hold promise, but more can be done.  This requires partnership 
with the countries in this region to develop tax incentives that create a path 
for investment in a manner that advances the important goals of the U.N.’s 
SDGs. 
II. STANDARDS AND BURDENS 
One of the major initiatives designed to promulgate common standards 
affecting substantive tax rules was the OECD’s Harmful Tax Competition 
 
 18. Id. 
 19. Id. 
 20. Id. 
 21. OFFICE OF THE CHIEF ECON. FOR THE AFRICAN REGION, AFRICA’S PULSE: AN ANALYSIS OF 
ISSUES SHAPING AFRICA’S ECONOMIC FUTURE 29–30 (2020). 
 22. See, e.g., Sony Kassam, E-Commerce Tax Avoidance Leads to Banks Being Tapped As 
Collectors, BLOOMBERG TAX (Sept. 4, 2019, 12:01 AM), https://news.bloombergtax.com/daily-tax-
report/e-commerce-tax-avoidance-leads-to-banks-being-tapped-as-collectors (stating how tax 
authorities enlisted help from banks to collect untaxed revenue going through e-commerce platforms). 
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Report (HTCR), issued in 1998.23  The HTCR criticized two types of tax 
regimes: 1) tax havens generally imposing no or nominal tax on income, and 
2) harmful tax regimes in which a country collects significant income tax 
revenue but its system has preferential features that subjects specified income 
to no or low taxation.24  The OECD deemed these regimes harmful for several 
reasons.  These included: distortion of investment flows, undermining 
integrity and fairness of tax systems, re-shaping desired level and mix of taxes 
and public spending, shift of tax burden to less mobile bases, and increase in 
administrative and compliance costs on tax authorities.25  Failure of the HTCR 
to condemn tax strategies, which developed countries were using in their own 
regimes to compete,26 signaled that the OECD’s real concern was on regime-
design that allowed offending countries to attract investment from its 
members. 
Developing countries appeared on the original so-called “black-list,” 
published by the OECD presumably to bring notoriety, signaling that these 
countries failed to comply with generally accepted standards.27  Noting the 
absence of a role for developing countries in constructing international 
standards, the list was decried by those outside the OECD as a patriarchal 
move to portray those listed in a bad light and as in need of policing. 
The opprobrium resulting from assessment of country regimes as harmful 
(or not) led to complaints concerning the lack of participation by developing 
and other outsider countries in the initial construction of the standards.  Some 
argued for a focus on transparency through exchange of information in lieu of 
stigma-creating blacklisting.28  In numerous meetings post launch of the 
 
 23. OECD, HARMFUL TAX COMPETITION: AN EMERGING GLOBAL ISSUE (1998) [hereinafter 
OECD, HTC]; see also Asa Johansson et al., Anti-Avoidance Rules Against International Tax 
Planning: A Classification (OECD Econ. Dep’t, Working Paper, Paper No. 1356, 2016).   
 24. OECD, HTC, supra note 23, at 16, 19.  
 25. Id. at 16. 
 26. Id. at 8–9.  Ireland, for example, a member of the OECD and the European Union, shifted to a 
12.5% corporate income tax rate in a move designed to attract multinational businesses.  Jonathan 
Keane, Ireland Stands by Its Iconic 12.5% Tax Rate as OECD Races for Reforms, CNBC (Nov. 3, 
2020, 1:16 AM), https://www.cnbc.com/2020/11/03/ireland-stands-by-its-corporate-tax-rate-as-oecd-
races-for-reforms-.html?&qsearchterm=ireland%20stands.  In a compromise intended to appease 
members, the OECD blessed low tax-rate-type competition when built into the general tax scheme 
(i.e., the low-rate applied generally and was not limited to certain limited types of income (known as 
“ring-fencing”).  OECD, HTC, supra note 23, at 26.  
 27. See The OECD Issues The List of Unco-operative Tax Havens, OECD (Apr. 18, 2002), 
http://www.oecd.org/ctp/harmful/theoecdissuesthelistofunco-operativetaxhavens.htm. 
 28. See, e.g., International Tax Standards, OECD http://www.oecd.org/tax/transparency/what-we-
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Report, representatives of developing nations rejected classification resulting 
from a process into which they had no input.29  This led to the formation in 
2000 of the Global Forum on Transparency and Exchange of Information in 
Tax Matters (Global Forum, or Forum), now comprising 161 member-nations, 
including sub-Saharan countries, which focuses on assessment of 
transparency in tax administration and effective exchange of information in 
civil and criminal tax matters instead of on shaming and judgment.30  The 
standards used to review these tax systems is largely reflected in the OECD’s 
Convention on Mutual Administrative Assistance in Tax Matters.31  There is 
peer examination of the tax systems of Forum members, which accords a role 
to all member nations expanded beyond the smaller OECD membership.32 
Along with the HTCR, the OECD issued its Tax Sparing Report,33 which 
condemned a practice by which many countries provided incentives for 
investment by their resident multinationals in developing countries.  One 
version of tax sparing allowed residents a credit against home country liability 
for fictional taxes on income derived in the developing country, which was 
exempt in the source country because of a tax holiday offered to certain 
classes of investors.34  The OECD recommended an end to the practice of 
granting tax-sparing credits for several reasons.  Primarily, it felt that the grant 
of a tax-sparing credit might unfairly compete with industries in the residence 
 
do/ (last visited Feb. 22, 2021) (“The Global Forum supports its members in tackling offshore tax 
evasion by monitoring, reviewing and assisting jurisdictions to implement the international standards 
on transparency and exchange of information for tax purposes.”). 
 29. See, e.g., Alexander Townsend, Jr., The Global Schoolyard Bully: The Organisation for 
Economic Co-operation and Development’s Coercive Efforts to Control Tax Competition, 25 
FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 215, 217–18 (2001). 
 30. See Putting an End to Offshore Tax Evasion, OECD, http://www.oecd.org/tax/transparency/ 
(last visited Feb. 22, 2021); see also Overview, OECD, http://www.oecd.org/tax/transparency/who-
we-are/ (last visited Feb. 22, 2021) (“The Global Forum is a group of over 160 jurisdictions that 
includes all G20 countries, financial centres, and the majority of its members are developing countries.  
Together they work on an equal footing to put an end to offshore tax evasion.”). 
 31. See Convention on Mutual Administrative Assistance in Tax Matters, OECD, 
http://www.oecd.org/ctp/exchange-of-tax-information/convention-on-mutual-administrative-
assistance-in-tax-matters.htm [hereinafter Convention on Mutual Administrative Assistance in Tax 
Matters Website] (last updated Sept. 2020).  This is based on a 2002 predecessor, the OECD Model 
Agreement on Exchange of Information in Tax Matters.  See OECD, THE MULTILATERAL 
CONVENTION ON MUTUAL ADMINISTRATIVE ASSISTANCE IN TAX MATTERS 31 (2011). 
 32. See OECD Tax Policy Studies, Taxation of Household Savings, OECD, 
https://doi.org/10.1787/9789264289536-en (last visited Feb. 22, 2021). 
 33. OECD, TAX SPARING: A RECONSIDERATION (1998) [hereinafter TAX SPARING REPORT]. 
 34. Id. at 21–22. 
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country (because moving operations to a host country with a zero rate of tax 
and allowing a credit for the income derived against residence country tax 
would disadvantage residence country businesses subject to tax without the 
benefit of a deemed foreign tax credit).  It also contended that there was a 
likelihood that profits from operations might be repatriated to a residence 
country that features a regime exempting foreign source income, rather than 
re-invested in the host country. 
An important reason to question tax sparing, not offered by the OECD, 
was the imbalance of power in the negotiation between the host country 
offering the tax holiday and the multinational corporation resident in a 
developed country.  The dangers posed by acceding to tax-rate-lowering 
demands and other concessions could harm the ability of the host developing 
country to protect an adequate revenue base or shore up other factors in the 
economy that could support achievement of sustainability goals.35  Moreover, 
the OECD’s contention that tax sparing was no longer needed because 
developing countries had become “economically much more sophisticated” 
and had “reached an economic level which [was] equivalent or even superior 
to that of some [OECD] Member countries” failed to justify such a move 
concerning sub-Saharan African countries that quite obviously did not hold 
such a position of economic strength.36 
When the Tax Sparing Report was issued, all but five OECD member 
countries had tax-sparing treaties with non-members.37  This number 
gradually eroded after the OECD’s recommendation that members abrogate 
treaties allowing the practice.38  Today, only a handful of countries, including 
 
 35. See, e.g., Karen B. Brown, Missing Africa: Should U.S. International Tax Rules Accommodate 
Investment in Developing Countries?, 23 U. PA. J. INT’L ECON. LAW 45, 68–76 (2002) (recommending 
a treaty-based exemption system in lieu of a tax sparing credit for income derived from increased 
investment in sub-Saharan Africa with provisions for environmental sustainability, worker rights, and 
sustainable tax rates). 
 36. TAX SPARING REPORT, supra note 33, at 21. 
 37. Id. at 68–69.  Only Iceland, Ireland, Portugal, Turkey, and the United States had no tax-sparing 
treaties.  Id. at 68–69.  The U.S. has firmly opposed grant of the credit.  See id. at 68–69. 
 38. Id. at 41–43.  The OECD advised that the practice of granting tax sparing credits should be re-
examined, with the Committee on Fiscal Affairs recommending that they should be granted only to 
“countries the economic level of which is considerably below that of . . . member countries.”  Id. at 
42–43.  The Report, however, caused countries to reconsider the practice even for needy countries.  
See, e.g., Kim Brooks, Tax Sparing: A Needed Incentive for Foreign Investment in Low-Income 
Countries or an Unnecessary Revenue Sacrifice?, 34 QUEENS L.J. 505, 538 (2009) (noting that any 
benefits from attracting foreign investment are outweighed by the costs to the low-income country); 
Deborah Toaze, Tax Sparing: Good Intentions, Unintended Results, 49 CANADIAN TAX J. 879, 880 
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France, Germany, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom, continue the 
practice.39 
The Tax Sparing Report recommendations placed developing countries 
in a tough spot.  They were forced to fit their own regimes into conformity 
with a template into which they had very little, if any, input.  Consequently, 
some of these countries found themselves in the position of signaling 
acceptance of a developed-world standard in an effort to be viewed as 
cooperative, while surreptitiously doing what was necessary to attract 
investment even if those measures deviated from the enunciated norms.40 
Since the HTCR, the most extensive push to develop international 
standards governing emerging issues in international taxation has been the 
BEPS initiative directed by the OECD.  This initiative gained momentum after 
meetings in 2012 led G20 nations to recommend measures that would target 
a number of areas in which multinationals gained unintended tax advantages 
simply by exploiting differences in countries’ tax laws.41  Areas of concern 
are wide-ranging and include targeting schemes that use hybrid entities42 to 
achieve double non-taxation of income, strengthening controlled foreign 
corporation (CFC) provisions to limit tax avoidance effected through off-
shore subsidiaries, restricting rules allowing excessive interest deductions that 
erode the tax bases of residence countries of both the payer and payee, 
cracking down on treaty and transfer pricing abuses, and eliminating harmful 
 
(2001) (“[T]ax sparing has produced only marginal economic benefits while providing opportunities 
for tax avoidance.”). 
 39. See Celine Azemar & Dhammika Dharmapala, Tax Sparing Agreements, Territorial Tax 
Reforms, and Foreign Direct Investment, J. PUB. ECON. 1, 20 (2018), http://pubdocs.worldbank. 
org/en/281751559591312068/celine-Azmar.pdf. 
 40. See, e.g., Jalia Kangave, International Taxation: The Case of Uganda, in TAXATION & 
DEVELOPMENT—A COMPARATIVE STUDY 280, 283 (2017) (Karen B. Brown ed., 2017) (noting 
Uganda’s deference to OECD guidelines in documents and its commitment to taking steps to conform 
with internationally accepted tax practices, but acknowledging that “[w]hile there is no legal 
framework backing tax holidays, the government continues to provide them on an ad hoc basis”). 
 41. OECD, BEPS PROJECT EXPLANATORY STATEMENT: 2015 FINAL REPORTS 4 (2015) 
[hereinafter 2015 FINAL REPORTS].  In particular, the OECD maintained that “[t]he current rules have 
. . . revealed weaknesses that create opportunities for Base Erosion and Profit Shifting (BEPS), thus 
requiring a bold move by policy makers to restore confidence in the system and ensure that profits are 
taxed where economic activities take place and value is created.”  Id. 
 42. See PEI Staff, Hybrid Entities and Tax Treaties, PRIV. EQUITY INT’L (July 8, 2004), 
https://www.privateequityinternational.com/hybrid-entities-and-tax-treaties/.  Hybrid entities are 
those classified differently by two or more countries (e.g., an entity treated as a partnership by one and 
a corporation by another) with the result that the entity may pay no tax in any jurisdiction, often 
because of tax treaty advantages.  Id. 
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tax practices.43  The BEPS project resulted in a final report issued in 2015.44  
Connected with implementing these standards, in December 2016, the OECD 
adopted a model Multilateral Instrument intended to modify existing bilateral 
tax treaties in order to permit incorporation of many of the BEPS standards.45  
The BEPS Inclusive Framework, finalized in 2017, invited non-member 
countries, including developing countries, to work with the OECD and G20 
members on issues related to standards and attendant issues, and to review 
and monitor implementation of the entire BEPS package.46  As noted by 
prominent scholars, however, neither the BEPS Project nor the Inclusive 
Framework was “designed to deal with the issues faced by developing 
countries.”47  Several subsequent reports have detailed implementation of the 
prescribed measures.48 
The BEPS initiatives were a first step in an effort to ultimately establish 
universal standards, designed with the intention of engaging so-called “third 
countries” (non-OECD and non-G20 nations).49  Input by these third parties 
was delayed, however, until after finalization of key components.50  Launch 
of the Project in 2013 and issuance of final reports at the end of 2015 without 
full third-party participation ensured that the resulting standards could not 
fully address developing country needs.  There was limited consultation with 
developing countries before 2015 in the form of working groups, but this was 
 
 43. AP ON BASE EROSION, supra note 11, at 29–40.  There are fifteen action areas.  Id. at 14–24.  
In its action plan, the G20 directed the OECD to develop items addressing “instances where the 
interaction of different tax rules [led] to double non-taxation or less than single taxation” and 
“arrangements that achieve[d] no or low taxation by shifting profits away from jurisdictions where the 
activities creating those profits [took] place.”  Id. at 10. 
 44. BEPS 2015 Final Reports, OECD, https://www.oecd.org/ctp/beps-2015-final-reports.htm (last 
visited Feb. 23, 2021).  
 45. See OECD, INCLUSIVE FRAMEWORK ON BEPS 1–44 (2017); OECD, BACKGROUND BRIEF: 
INCLUSIVE FRAMEWORK ON BEPS 5–23 (2017). 
 46. See BEPS 2015 Final Reports, supra note 44. 
 47. Irma Johanna Mosquera Valderrama et al., Tax and Development: The Link Between 
International Taxation, The Base Erosion Profit Shifting Project and the 2030 Sustainable 
Development Agenda 8 (United Nations Univ., Working Paper No. W-2018/4, 2018). 
 48. See BEPS Reports, OECD, https://www.oecd.org/tax/beps-reports.htm (last visited Feb. 23, 
2021). 
 49. See OECD, COUNTERING HARMFUL TAX PRACTICES MORE EFFECTIVELY, TAKING INTO 
ACCOUNT TRANSPARENCY AND SUBSTANCE, ACTION 5: 2015 FINAL REPORT 68 (2015) [hereinafter 
ACTION 5 FINAL REPORT]. 
 50. See id. (“Action 5 of the BEPS Action Plan (OECD, 2013) explicitly recognised the need to 
involve third countries and requested the [Forum on Harmful Tax Practices] to develop a strategy to 
engage non-OECD/ non-G20 countries into the work on harmful tax practices.”). 
[Vol. 48: 995, 2021]  Tax Incentives and Sub-Saharan Africa 
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW 
1007 
after the organizing principles of reform were in place.51 
The developing world’s enthusiasm for an active role in shaping the 
BEPS prescriptions was evident in its demand that the U.N. Committee of 
Experts on International Cooperation in Tax Matters (U.N. Tax Committee) 
take the leadership role in charting the path to tax reform.52  The goal was to 
construct a process open to worldwide approaches to taxation, such as those 
embodied in formulary apportionment and other proposals, that seeks to 
bridge the jurisdictional boundaries of the separate country regimes.  This was 
the approach developing countries had in mind when they advocated for 
institution of a World Tax Organization.53 
For years, developing countries, lacking a membership role in the OECD, 
have urged the establishment of a World Tax Organization that would allow 
a broader-than-high-income country view and seek solutions to cross-border 
tax avoidance that consider their needs.54  This work would have been taken 
up by the U.N. Tax Committee, upgraded to the status of an inter-
governmental body.  As an intergovernmental body, the U.N. Tax Committee, 
with expanded governmental representation and an adequate budget, would 
have been in a position to convene a “World Tax Organization,” a significant 
counter-weight to membership of the OECD.55  Under a World Tax 
Organization, the direction of tax reform could have questioned building the 
BEPS project to protect choices made by OECD members about their own tax 
bases.56 
 
 51. See generally OECD, PART 1 OF A REPORT TO G20 DEVELOPMENT WORKING GROUP ON THE 
IMPACT OF BEPS IN LOW INCOME COUNTRIES (2014) [hereinafter DEVELOPMENT WORKING GROUP 
PART 1]; OECD, PART 2 OF A REPORT TO G20 DEVELOPMENT WORKING GROUP ON THE IMPACT OF 
BEPS IN LOW INCOME COUNTRIES (2014); see also Irma Johanna Mosquera Valderrama, The OECD-
BEPS Measures to Deal with Aggressive Tax Planning in South America and Sub-Saharan Africa: 
The Challenges Ahead, 43 INTERTAX 615, 616, 619 (2015) (detailing U.N.-sponsored workshops in 
2014 addressing BEPS on Tax Base Protection for Developing Countries, an IMF policy paper 
addressing spillovers (the impact on developed country tax practices on developing countries), and 
questionnaires solicited by the U.N. from developing countries to obtain information to be addressed  
at a second conference on protecting the developing countries’ tax base). 
 52. U.N. Dep’t of Econ. & Soc. Affairs, Countries Reach Historic Agreement to Generate 
Financing for New Sustainable Development Agenda, https://www.un.org/africarenewal/news/ 
countries-reach-historic-agreement-generate-financing-new-sustainable-development-agenda (last 
visited Feb. 23, 2021). 
 53. See David Spencer, U.N. Tax Committee, Developing Countries, and Civil Society 
Organizations, 26 J. INT’L TAX’N 42, 44 (2015). 
 54. Id.  
 55. Id. 
 56. Id. (citing Mindy Herzfeld’s observation that “[a]t the core, the concern by Western nations 
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This proposal to expand the U.N. Tax Committee into a World Tax 
Organization was rejected at the United Nations Third International 
Conference on Financing and Development, held in Addis Ababa in July 
2015, a decision said to make sense in large part because the OECD’s BEPS 
project was already underway.57  Although the conference concluded that the 
OECD-led process would adequately account for the concerns of developing 
nations, a few months later, in October 2015, the OECD issued its final BEPS 
reports on the fifteen covered initiatives.58  The underlying premise of the final 
proposals for a response to targeted types of tax avoidance (namely, 
exploitation of gaps in different countries’ tax systems that lead to non-
taxation of income by any country and use of various vehicles to shift income 
to low or no tax jurisdictions) was protection of the tax bases of OECD 
members and the G20.  The final reports reflect an intention to involve 
developing nations in the implementation of the initiatives, but this came after 
fundamental steps to shape the project had been taken.59 
One of the critical issues concerning the direction of the BEPS Project, 
but foreclosed from consideration at an early stage, was whether tax avoidance 
could be better addressed by a global approach in the design of different 
countries’ regimes.  Harmonization or coordination of countries’ substantive 
tax rules could occur in any number of ways, including one of the dominant 
proposals—formulary apportionment.  To describe it simply, formulary 
apportionment would require all countries to agree to allocate rights to tax 
income of multinational enterprises under an agreed formula.  This method 
 
about upgrading the status of the U.N. Tax Committee may reflect the broader fear of the United States 
and the countries of the EU that as the agenda of international tax reform—and ultimately international 
tax rules more broadly—tilts from the West to the East, the historical system that generally favored 
residence or capital-exporting countries will also tilt to favor source countries”); see also Mindy 
Herzfeld, New Analysis: Who Will Control the Future of International Tax Policy, TAXNOTES (May 
4, 2015), https://www.taxnotes.com/tax-notes-today-international/tax-policy/news-analysis-who-will 
-control-future-international-tax-policy/2015/05/04/h1jw?highlight=core%2C%20the%20concern% 
20by%20Western%20nations.  
 57. U.N. Dep’t of Econ. & Soc. Affairs, Countries Reach Historic Agreement to Generate 
Financing for New Sustainable Development Agenda (July 15, 2015), https://www.un.org/en/ 
development/desa/news/financing/historic-agreement-sustainable-development-agenda.html (noting 
how the newly adopted Addis Ababa Action Agenda “calls for strengthening support for the work of 
the U.N. Committee of Experts on International Cooperation in Tax Matters to improve its 
effectiveness and operational capacity”). 
 58. See 2015 FINAL REPORTS, supra note 41, at 13–18. 
 59. Id. at 4 (commenting that the report “represents the results of a major and unparalleled effort 
by OECD and G20 countries working together on an equal footing with the participation of an 
increasing number of developing countries”). 
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allocates income on a worldwide basis and is designed to eliminate the ability 
of businesses to shift income across countries through legal and accounting 
techniques.60 
Under one proposal advocated by Professor Reuven Avi-Yonah, the 
worldwide income derived by each business activity of a multinational group 
(based on the functions performed by related parties) would be determined by 
subtracting worldwide expenses and allocating the net result based on a global 
accounting system among all countries in which the activity was conducted.61  
An estimated market return on tax-deductible expenses (“routine” income) 
would be allocated to the country in which the expenses were incurred, and 
the remainder of the income (“residual” income) would be allocated based on 
the group’s relative sales into each country—a destination sales-based 
formulary apportionment method.62  A variant of this method was embraced 
by the BEPS Action Eleven on transfer pricing, but it was rejected as an 
overarching theory that could have led to an entirely different set of reform 
prescriptions.  The Avi-Yonah proposal held promise because it aimed to 
address the ability of multinationals to artificially shift income and ownership 
of intangible property.63  This type of income manipulation occurs between 
multinational residents of high-income countries in transactions involving 
developing countries—a problem with no ready solution.64 
While formulary apportionment may not be the final answer to the 
problem of international tax avoidance through income shifting,65 it provides 
an example of a worldwide approach that could have involved developing 
countries in the tax regime design process at the outset.  Nevertheless, as early 
as 2013 when it formulated its action plan, the OECD noted that “there [was] 
consensus among governments that moving to a system of formulary [or other 
 
 60. Reuven S. Avi-Yonah et al.,, Allocating Business Profits for Tax Purposes: A Proposal to 
Adopt a Formulary Profit Split, 9 FLA. TAX REV. 497, 507–509 (2009). 
 61. Id. at 508. 
 62. Id. at 508–09. 
 63. See C. Annalise Musselman, The Best of Both Methods: A Proposal for a Hybrid International 
Transfer Pricing Method, 16 S.C. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 57, 72 (2020) (asserting that the possible benefit 
of formulary apportionment is the method’s ability to “diminish[] multinational companies’ incentives 
to shift income from one country to another”). 
 64. Id. at 73 (stating that, while the “current system allows for corporations to shift income 
primarily through the relocation of intangibles to lower-tax jurisdictions,” the formulary 
apportionment method does not let this artificial shifting of income and intangible assets “have much 
effect on their end tax liability”). 
 65. See, e.g., Susan C. Morse, Revisiting Global Formulary Apportionment, 29 VA. TAX REV. 593 
(2010). 
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worldwide] apportionment of profits [was] not a viable way forward.”66  
Devising the proposal and later seeking developing country buy-in seems 
coercive and unilateral.67 
With only a peripheral role in tax design, developing countries are 
nonetheless expected to take on significant burdens to achieve a label of 
“compliant” with an increasing burden of standards to be met.68  
Implementation of the BEPS proposals will require developing countries to 
shoulder a substantial compliance burden, including revision of internal 
statutory law and treaty rules.69 
The past two decades have also witnessed a deluge of standard-making in 
the administrative arena, supplementing or even standing apart from the 
initiatives seeking to harmonize substantive law.  In addition to the Mutual 
Administrative Assistance Convention arising out of the HTC project and the 
Multilateral Instrument, both described above, the United States, the 
European Union, and the OECD have heightened requirements for record-
keeping, information exchange, data collection, and administrative 
assistance.70  Among the most important of these are the Foreign Account Tax 
Compliance Act (FATCA) rules and the European Union-led Common 
Reporting Standards.71 
The FATCA rules, of primary focus in this article, require financial 
institutions to disclose account information, obtain reliable documentation on 
the identity and whereabouts of the account holder, and withhold tax on 
payments received on behalf of U.S. taxpayers in the event appropriate 
documentation is not obtained.72  Countries and their financial institutions 
 
 66. AP ON BASE EROSION, supra note 11, at 14. 
 67. David E. Spencer, The EOCD Work Program: Digitalization of the Economy, Part 10, 31 J. 
INT’L TAX’N 62, 62 (2020) (citing Lucas De Lima Carvalho, The Trouble with ‘Pillars’ in 
International Tax Policy, TAXNOTES (July 2, 2020), https://www.taxnotes.com/special-reports/digital-
economy/trouble-pillars-international-tax-policy/2020/07/02/2cnhm). 
 68. See Reuven S. Avi-Yonah & Haiyan Xu, Evaluating BEPS: A Reconsideration of the Benefits 
Principle and Proposal for UN Oversight, 6 HARV. BUS. L. REV. 185, 211 (2016) (stating that 
developing countries “might be hurt due to the effect of negative spill-over arising from the 
implementation of the BEPS project . . . because of their limited influence in the renovation of the 
current rules”). 
 69. See Eric M. Zolt, Tax Treaties and Developing Countries, 72 N.Y.U. TAX L. REV. 111, 120 
(2018). 
 70. See Convention on Mutual Administrative Assistance in Tax Matters Website, supra note 31. 
 71. See Richard Levine et al., FATCA and the Common Reporting Standard: A Comparison, 27 J. 
INT’L TAX’N 43, 43–44 (2016). 
 72. See Arthur J. Cockfield, Big Data and Tax Haven Secrecy, 18 FLA. TAX REV. 483, 494–95 
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were forced, as of the end of 2016,73 to become “FATCA-compliant” in order 
to avoid the most serious consequence, which is the inability to receive 
payments from U.S. banks and other non-bank financial institutions or entities 
(including those in which a U.S. person has an equity or debt interest),74 free 
of the imposition of the U.S. withholding tax.75  Compliance with FATCA 
also requires the automatic exchange of information regarding offshore 
financial accounts and assets of U.S. citizens and residents. 
The FATCA accords did not occur without significant objection by other 
countries and their financial institutions.  The particular concern was the 
unilateral “extraterritorial enforcement” of the U.S. tax law aimed at 
uncovering hidden assets of U.S. citizens and residents.76  FATCA compliance 
was assured nonetheless because no foreign bank or non-bank financial 
institution could afford to lose a U.S. customer base—a result almost 
guaranteed if they did not comply with FATCA requirements, because U.S. 
banks would be forced to withhold payments to these entities on behalf of 
U.S. customers or interest-holders.  As of November 2020, 113 countries were 
FATCA-compliant through entry into complex agreements with the United 
States.  Some of these agreements require the country in question to provide 
specified information directly to the IRS.77  Others involve reporting by the 
foreign financial institution resident in these countries directly to the IRS.78  
These agreements have resulted from lengthy negotiations and place 
considerable burden on the signatories.  To be a player in the global 
 
(2016) (outlining the FATCA requirements). 
 73. See DUN & BRADSTREET, THE FATCA REPORT 2 (2016) (“In most jurisdictions 30th June 
2016 was set as the deadline for compliance.”). 
 74. Levine et al., supra note 71, at 46. 
 75. See, e.g., Michael L. Buenger, The EU’s ETS and Global Aviation: Why “Local Rules” Still 
Matter and May Matter Even More in the Future, 41 DENV. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 417, 428 n.50 (2013) 
(stating that, under FATCA, foreign banks must “locate American account holders and disclose their 
balances, receipts, and withdrawals to the Internal Revenue Service or be subject to a thirty percent 
withholding tax on income from U.S. financial assets held by the banks”) (citing Foreign Account Tax 
Compliance Act, 26 U.S.C. §§ 1471–74 (2012)). 
 76. Levine et al., supra note 71, at 46. 
 77. See Nirav Dhanawade, I Got 99 Problems and They’re All FATCA, 35 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 
139, 159 (2014) (noting that these agreements, known as Model 1 Intergovernmental Agreements, 
require a “dual exchange of information between the United States and a foreign government regarding 
their respective resident account holders” and require foreign financial institutions “to report specified 
information about accounts held by U.S. citizens”). 
 78. Id. at 161 (stating that these agreements, known as Model 2 Intergovernmental Agreements, 
“cut out the middleman by requiring [foreign financial institutions] to directly report information to 
the IRS”). 
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marketplace, low-income countries must become FATCA-compliant.79 
The OECD has developed a parallel information reporting regime, known 
as the Common Reporting Standard (CRS).  CRS will eventually require the 
signatory nations to automatically exchange prescribed financial asset 
information.  CRS signatories enter into Competent Authority Agreements 
(CAAs) like FATCA Intergovernmental Agreements (IGAs), but the CRS 
enforcement mechanism is different.  With the absence of penalty measures 
like the ones available to the United States in the event of noncompliance, 
enforcement of the CAAs will depend upon the internal laws of the respective 
parties to the agreement.  As of December 2020, 110 countries had committed 
to become, or had become, CRS signatories.80  Of these, nine developing 
countries had committed to agreements implementing CRS.81  Absent from 
the group is the United States, which has indicated that it will not sign.82 
The burden of conformity is considerable.83  Reform was constructed 
initially without regard for the special circumstances of low-income countries.  
As a result, some solutions interfere with revenue-raising strategies of these 
countries.84  Others are a challenge to the capacity of their tax administrations. 
  
 
 79. See, e.g., Chi Tran, International Transfer Pricing and the Elusive Arm’s Length Standard: A 
Proposal for Disclosure of Advance Pricing Agreements as a Tool for Taxpayer Equality, 25 SW. J. 
INT’L L. 207, 209 (2019) (noting how developing countries also need to be FATCA compliant to 
improve their education, healthcare, and infrastructure).  Currently, the signatories  from the Caribbean 
region are The Bahamas, Barbados, Bermuda, Cayman Islands, Dominica, Guyana, St. Kitts and 
Nevis, St. Vincent and Grenadines, Trinidad and Tobago, and Turks and Caicos. 
 80. Signatories of the Multilateral Competent Authority Agreement on Automatic Exchange of 
Financial Account Information and Intended First Information Exchange Date, OECD (Dec. 10, 
2020), http://oecd.org/tax/automatic-exchange/international-framework-for-the-crs/crs-mcaa-
signatories.pdf [hereinafter Signatories of the CRS]. 
 81. Id. (showing that the developing country signatories include Antiqua and Barbuda, Aruba, The 
Bahamas, Barbados, Dominica, Ghana, St. Kitts and Nevis, Saint Martin, and Trinidad and Tobago). 
 82. Perhaps because it was the first mover, the United States is the one nonparticipant in CRS 
exempted from hardships resulting from non-signatory status.  See Levine et al., supra note 71, at 50. 
 83. See Ivan O. Ozai, Tax Competition and the Ethics of Burden Sharing, 42 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 
61, 71 (2018) (noting the larger burden for collecting taxes and compliance costs in the developing 
world than the developed world). 
 84. See Zolt, supra note 69, at 114 (suggesting that “developing countries should hesitate before 
. . . entering into tax treaties with developed countries” because of (a) “doubts about the general utility 
of tax treaties”; (b) “a belief that the lost revenue from yielding tax rights exceeds the benefits of these 
treaties”; and (c) “concerns that tax treaties facilitate aggressive tax-avoidance strategies”). 
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III. INCENTIVES AND SDGS 
Consultation to determine the issues facing developing countries in the 
implementation of BEPS revealed the following challenges: 
• The BEPS focus on sophisticated tax planning techniques is of 
limited interest to developing countries because they typically 
face simpler tax avoidance techniques not captured by BEPS 
proposals.85 
• Legislation in developing countries may be insufficiently 
complete to target areas of greatest risk because multinationals 
may be able to shift profits by means that avoid focus.86 
• Developing countries are often unable to obtain information 
necessary to enable adequate risk assessment.87 
• Developing countries lack administrative capacity (structure and 
staff) to enforce complex anti-avoidance rules or to apply 
effective dispute resolution mechanisms.88 
• Regional mechanisms that support political awareness of the 
challenges of base erosion and profit shifting or buy-in to the 
need for change and resource commitment are lacking.89 
• Developing countries are relegated to providing tax incentives 
for investment from high-income multinationals that ultimately 
may undermine revenue goals (a so-called “race to the bottom” 
that may worsen the economic position of these countries).90 
Many of the challenges arise from the initial development and design of 
the BEPS project without addressing the burden of implementation by 
developing countries.  The BEPS project not only failed to acknowledge 
tensions between the OECD member countries and the developing world, but 
it also failed to conceive of its goal as one to question the accepted roots of 
the international tax system as one based on self-interest and re-tool it as one 
based on global welfare maximization.91  As Professor Mindy Herzfeld noted: 
 
 85. DEVELOPMENT WORKING GROUP PART 1, supra note 51, at 12. 
 86. Id. at 12. 
 87. Id. at 12. 
 88. Id. at 13. 
 89. Id. at 14. 
 90.  Id. at 14. 
 91. Herzfeld, supra note 12, at 6–7. 
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The project also failed to address another set of broader, more 
philosophical questions, rooted in economics but also in concerns 
over fairness in the context of global economic development.  The 
tools that public finance economists have developed for analyzing 
what constitutes sound policy in a domestic setting are not easily 
transportable when the questions morph from those having to do with 
maximizing economic welfare within a particular set of borders to 
maximizing welfare globally.  No country has signed on to such a 
concept as the basis for international tax rules that may lead to the 
diminishing of its own revenue intake.  In a coordination setting, 
larger countries can and likely will act to negotiate and implement 
rules that may work to their best advantage, potentially to the 
disadvantage of smaller and less powerful countries, and the BEPS 
project largely failed to assuage such concerns.92 
The imperfect design of the BEPS project has led to a project of 
international reform that has left developing countries on the sidelines.  The 
marginalization of those countries, particularly those in the sub-Saharan 
Africa region, is of particular concern.  This region consistently falls at the 
bottom of most lists of economic indicators with a large component of 
residents living in extreme poverty.  The COVID-19 pandemic has only 
pressed the region into further destitution. 
According to the World Bank Group, recovery in the region will depend 
on job creation and economic transformation.93  This will require digital 
transformation (expansion of the digital infrastructure),94 sectoral reallocation 
(a shift from raw exports to maximizing regional value chains),95 and spatial 
integration.96  Advances have been observed even as the pandemic has played 
out.97  Strengthening of the public health system and social protection systems 
has been achieved by the leveraging of the region’s digital economies.98  
 
 92. Id. at 7 (citations omitted). 
 93. OFFICE OF THE CHIEF ECON. FOR THE AFRICAN REGION, AFRICA’S PULSE: AN ANALYSIS OF 
ISSUES SHAPING AFRICA’S ECONOMIC FUTURE 68–69 (2020). 
 94. Id. 
 95. Id. at 70. 
 96. Id. at 117–20. 
 97. Id. at 51–53. 
 98. Id. at 4, 51–53 (“Evidence shows that at the height of the lockdown, 25 percent of the firms in 
Sub-Saharan Africa accelerated the use of digital technologies and increased investments in digital 
solutions in response to COVID-19.”). 
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Participation of the international community will be vital to the realization of 
these goals.99  This presents the occasion to consider three ways in which the 
BEPS project can be reimagined to provide support to the region through tax 
reform. 
A. Treaty-Based Support of Regional Tax Incentives 
Action Five of the BEPS Project100 relates to harmful tax practices and 
builds upon the work the OECD initiated when it issued the HTCR described 
above.101  It targets all harmful tax regimes and is not limited, as in the case 
of the HTCR, solely to geographically mobile activities, such as financial and 
other service activities, and it covers the provision of intangibles.102  Action 
Five indicates a resolve not to consider global tax design in the introduction, 
when the preamble notes that the initiative is “not intended to promote the 
harmonisation of income taxes or tax structures generally within or outisde 
the OECD.”103  While the report does not purport to “dictat[e] to any country 
what should be the appropriate level of tax rates,”104 it has the effect of 
countenancing the competitive moves of many developed countries 
(including, most recently, the United States) to compete by lowering tax rates 
in their separate regimes to attract foreign investment.105 
A trend among developed countries strapped for revenue after the 2008 
recession was the lowering of corporate income tax rates to attract 
multinationals.106  While Ireland was the first mover in the 1990s to a 12.5% 
maximum corporate income tax rate when most others were at 30% or higher, 
other countries have countered with their own rate reductions.107  The United 
Kingdom, Japan, Canada, and others have reduced their top statutory tax rates 
 
 99. Id. at 6. 
 100. See ACTION 5 FINAL REPORT, supra note 49, at 15–16. 
 101. See id. at 11–12. 
 102. See id. at 11. 
 103.  See id. at 11. 
 104.  See id. at 11. 
 105. See id. at 12 (“Countries have long recognised that a ‘race to the bottom’ would ultimately 
drive applicable tax rates on certain sources of income to zero for all countries, whether or not this is 
the tax policy a country wishes to pursue . . . .”). 
 106. Karen B. Brown, Taxation and Development: Overview, in TAXATION & DEVELOPMENT—A 
COMPARATIVE STUDY 3–16 (Karen B. Brown ed., 2017). 
 107. CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, INTERNATIONAL COMPARISONS OF CORPORATE INCOME TAX RATES 
2 (2017). 
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in recent years and the United States moved at the end of 2017 to a 21% flat 
tax rate, down from the 35% maximum rate.108  This type of competition for 
investment does not violate Action Five principles because it classifies a tax 
regime as “harmful preferential” only if the rate reduction applies only to 
particular activities, often known as “ring-fenced” regimes.  A rate much 
lower than that existing in other countries is not harmful under BEPS, so long 
as it applies generally to all corporate income.109 
This definition of harmful tax regime sanctioned the competitive 
strategies of developed countries, but it does not address one of the major 
issues facing developing countries—the ability to offer tax incentives to 
foreign investors.  The G20 Development Working Group, the OECD 
component charged with engaging with developing country issues, noted that 
while the topic was outside of the BEPS mandate, the use of tax incentives 
was a top concern for these nations.110 
Rate competition by the developed world forecloses any chance that 
developing countries can set corporate income tax rates high (or high enough) 
because multinational companies, committed to reducing the tax cost of doing 
business, will force rates downward as the price for investment.111  A 
developing country may respond to this pressure by offering a “tax holiday” 
to attract a given business activity of a multinational.112  Recognition of this 
effect of the “spillover” from the tax regimes of developed countries led 
authors of a recent study to recommend allocation of taxing rights to 
developing countries through source or other rules.113  Yet the Action Five 
Report condemns a practice of ring-fencing, of which a tax holiday is an 
example, as unfairly competitive, but provides little alternative for developing 
countries. 
 
 108. See id. at 1, 18, 21, 37. 
 109. UK’s Patent Box is a ring-fenced regime, but it was recently blessed by the OECD. 
 110. See DEVELOPMENT WORKING GROUP PART 1, supra note 51, at 14. 
 111. See id. 
 112. See, e.g., id.; Kangave, supra note 40, at 283. 
 113. INT’L MONETARY FUND, IMF POLICY PAPER: SPILLOVERS IN INTERNATIONAL CORPORATE 
TAXATION 11–12 (2014), https://www.imf.org/external/np/pp/eng/2014/050914.pdf [hereinafter IMF 
POLICY PAPER].  The IMF defines a spillover as “the impact that one jurisdiction’s tax rules or 
practices has on others.”  Id. at 12.  It notes the special importance of allocation of the rights to tax 
income to low-income countries as source countries and the “recipients of capital inflows,” but not 
investors in business activities outside their borders.  Id.  Because developed countries, as capital 
exporters, maintain the right to tax their resident multinationals, this may operate to the detriment of 
developing countries because developed countries are not concerned with the “fair” international 
allocation of tax revenue and powers across countries.  Id. at 11. 
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The move of many high-income countries to a territorial tax regime 
(featuring tax exemption for specified income from foreign business 
operations) offers an incentive to their resident multinationals to seek tax 
holidays.  If a multinational enterprise’s country of residence allows a 
participation exemption, resulting in nontaxation or very light taxation of 
earnings derived from operations abroad through a wholly-owned subsidiary, 
lower rates in the developing country will be attractive.  The United States, 
for example, enacted a dividends-received deduction (allowing a deduction 
for 100% of dividends received from a controlled foreign corporation), an 
effective exemption of U.S. taxation on certain foreign source business 
income.114  That exemption is allowed independently of any governing 
standards.  Consequently, a U.S. multinational could negotiate rock-bottom 
tax rates for income from investments in sub-Saharan Africa without little 
requirement to provide significant benefits to the country of investment.  A 
new U.S. tax, known as global intangible low-tax income (GILTI) is designed 
to offset the incentive to go offshore for low-tax income, but it may be  
subverted, and only works to the benefit of the U.S. Treasury.  It provides no 
incentive to invest in sub-Saharan Africa.115 
Without standards, the investment may be free of local taxation and fail 
to connect the benefits of tax-free operations with attainment of sustainability 
goals by the host location.  While the OECD drafted a set of policies and 
objectives concerning tax incentives, these have not been made an official part 
of Action Five.116  To support the ability of developing countries to attract 
much-needed foreign investment through carefully tailored tax incentives, this 
article proposes that the Multilateral Instrument to Implement Tax Treaty 
Related Matters to Prevent BEPS be amended to incorporate guidelines for 
these investments as informed by the SDGs. 
These would include best practices as to the design of the incentives as 
well as requirements for standards such as job creation, gender equity in the 
workplace, partnerships for infrastructure projects concerning roads, utilities, 
and housing, as well as for environmental protections.  These guidelines could 
also serve as a template for members of the OECD, as well as other countries 
 
 114. 26 U.S.C. § 245A (2018). 
 115.  26 U.S.C. § 250 (2017).  An incentive would exist if the dividends received deduction were 
available only for investment in sub-Saharan Africa.  See 26 U.S.C. § 243 (2018).  In its present form, 
the exemption works as an incentive to invest elsewhere if the rate is low and other non-tax incentives 
exist.  See IMF POLICY PAPER, supra note 113, at 20–21. 
 116. Id. 
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that enter into tax incentive agreements with sub-Saharan African nations.  
Negotiation of agreements in accordance with the guidelines either through 
the Multilateral Treaty or through one-on-one or regional treaties could be 
rewarded and publicized by maintenance of a publicly available list.  Unlike 
the black-lists that were used to characterize the developing country as a bad 
actor when the HTCR was launched, this list would commend the country 
incorporating the standards into their treaties as well as the multinationals that 
partner with the developing country as good actors that are advancing the path 
toward achievement of these important goals. 
B. Assist in Capacity Building 
As mentioned in Part I, developing countries may lack the capacity to 
implement many of the complex BEPS proposals.  An example is the 
enactment and enforcement of the transfer pricing proposals that span four 
reports.  Transfer pricing in a multinational group of companies offers the 
possibility that income is shifting among members to minimize tax liability.  
Developing countries may fall victim to pricing tax avoidance schemes if they 
lack the tools to detect them and the ability to bring audits to conclusion.117  
The BEPS reports detail a range of methodologies that require application and 
implementation by a tax administration that has the statutory support as well 
as the manpower to audit and assess complicated corporate transactions.  
Simplification of the standards will allow sub-Saharan countries to employ 
these standards to raise revenue.  The proposal is twofold. 
First, the recommendation is that the OECD devote resources to 
developing alternatives that may be readily applied by developing nations.  
The goal is to achieve a workable methodology readily instituted by the low-
income, resource-strapped country.118  Second, the recommendation is that the 
high-income countries develop a fund to assist in sub-Saharan nations to train, 
recruit, and effectively employ a solid tax administration.119  This would 
 
 117. See generally World Bank Confirms Economic Downturn, supra note 16. 
 118. See Afton Titus, Domestic Revenue Mobilization Through Corporate Income Tax in an African 
Developing Country Context, DALHOUSIE L.J. (forthcoming 2021). 
 119. See Ben Dickinson, Building Tax Systems in Developing Countries Is Vital to Overcoming 
COVID-19 and Achieving the SDGs, OECD (July 9, 2020), https://oecd-development-
matters.org/2020/7/09/building-tax-systems-in-developing-countries-is-vital-to-overcoming-covid-
19-and-achieving-the-sdgs/; Building Capacity to Prevent Profit Shifting by Large Companies in 
Zambia, OECD TAX & DEVELOPMENT CASE STUDY (2020), https://www.oecd.org/countries/ 
zambia/building-capacity-to-prevent-profit-shifting-by-large-companies-in-zambia.pdf.  
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enable the countries to collect the income needed to build infrastructure and a 
social safety network in support of SDGs.  An environmentally friendly way 
to build a fund would be to devote a small portion of an existing carbon tax or 
to enact one.  In the alternative, each OECD member could commit to 
contributing an annual amount to a tax administration fund.  Each member 
could partner with resident multinationals that are committed to assisting the 
developing world to increase administrative capacity, such as the members of 
the B-Team described in the Introduction that are committed to transparency 
in tax practices and to supporting effective tax administration.  These 
companies could undertake to provide technical expertise to tax offices in 
developing countries with which they are not involved in a controversy. 
C. Re-envision the BEPS Digital Economy Tax Proposals 
A cornerstone development in the BEPS project addresses the twenty-
first century challenges presented by the ever-evolving digital economy.  
Action One of the fifteen BEPS initiatives detailed a blueprint for targeting a 
type of tax-avoidance made possible by the failure of traditional tax doctrine 
to capture unique aspects of the profit-making capacity of online sales and 
services.120  In particular, longstanding treaty rules concerning jurisdictional 
limitations left governments unable to tax where the online business lacked a 
physical presence, termed a “fixed place of business,” within a State’s 
confines.  The OECD response is a two-pillar approach. 
Pillar One addresses the case of a digital business with no physical 
presence in a country (or only a distribution or marketing function) in a 
country.121  The impetus for the proposal is the recent enactment by countries, 
like France, of a digital services tax and is aimed at reaching an international 
consensus.  The resulting formulaic approach deemed necessary to establish 
a new taxing right over residual profits allocated to market jurisdictions is 
incredibly hard to implement (introducing three separate tax amounts 
determined under super-challenging transfer pricing rules) and may involve 
overlapping jurisdiction or multiple taxation of profits requiring a robust 
dispute resolution mechanism.  Finding the Pillar One “Unified Approach” a 
 
 120. See Addressing the Tax Challenges of the Digital Economy, Action 1: 2015 Final Report, 
OECD (2015), http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/9789264241046-en.  
 121. Secretariat Proposal for a “Unified Approach” under Pillar One, OECD (2019), 
https://www.oecd.org/tax/beps/public-consultation-document-secretariat-proposal-unified-approach-
pillar-one.pdf. 
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challenge to the administrative capacity of developing countries, a drafting 
group of developing country members of the U.N. Tax Committee has 
proposed an alternative, known as Article 12A, that permits withholding of 
automated digital services income on a gross basis, or an option for a simpler 
mechanism for net basis taxation, known as Article 12B.122 
This article’s third reform proposal is that the OECD pause its work to 
seriously consider and, possibly, redirect its path to take into account the U.N. 
Tax Committee’s drafting group alternative approach.  The BEPS project will 
fail to achieve legitimacy if it does not take into account the important 
obstacles to adoption and implementation of the proposals, particularly the 
digital services initiatives, in sub-Saharan Africa.  Many countries in that 
region are considering a digital services tax, not because it will raise 
significant revenue, but because they feel they must be participants in the 
global reform conversation launched by the OECD.123  While the revenue 
gains will inure to the benefit of high-income countries, sub-Saharan nations 
are pressured to play along if only to provide a measure of legitimacy to their 
own systems.124  Failure to re-envision the digital services proposals means 
that sub-Saharan Africa will not derive benefit from current tax reform. 
Pillar Two, which continues to be developed, advances the case for the 
imposition of a Global Anti-Base Erosion tax, or “GloBE” to reach certain 
profits from digital access to consumer markets.125  This proposal is designed 
to insure that large multinational enterprises pay a minimum level of tax 
regardless of where they are headquartered or operated.  A main feature is an 
income inclusion rule to apply whenever a multinational corporation is taxed 
 
 122. David E. Spencer, Taxation of the Digital Economy: Proposal by the UN Tax Committee, 31 
J. INT’L TAXATION 30 (Nov. 2020) (noting the work of the Drafting Group of Developing Country 
Members of the U.N. Tax Committee, a significant minority of the members of the Committee, to 
counter the OECD’s “Unified Approach” under Pillar One, and their particular concerns, including 
the complexity of the proposal, problems of implementation, administration, and coherence with 
developing country legal systems, and ability to obtain information necessary to enforce the proposed 
allocation of taxing rights).  
 123. See Nana Ama Sarfo, Digital Taxation in Africa: Safety in Numbers?, TAX NOTES INT’L (Sept. 
4, 2020), https://www.taxnotes.com/featured-analysis/digital-taxation-africa-safety-numbers/2020/ 
09/04/2cxds. 
 124. Id. (noting the view of the African Tax Administration Forum that “[w]hile the revenue raised 
would not be large for most African countries . . . a [digital services tax] could improve public 
confidence in the fairness of the tax system”). 
 125. Global Anti-Base Erosion Proposal (“GloBE”)—Pillar Two, OECD (2019), https://www. 
oecd.org/tax/beps/public-consultation-document-global-anti-base-erosion-proposal-pillar-two.pdf. 
pdf.  
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below a minimum effective tax rate.  The rule would result in an income 
inclusion at the controlled foreign corporation’s parent level in order to top up 
the rate. 
The Biden administration’s endorsement of the GloBE proposal provides 
a separate opportunity to shape tax reform in a direction that is meaningful for 
sub-Saharan Africa.126  Proper tailoring of a global minimum tax, adopted 
with an international consensus that includes this region, holds promise for 
worldwide coordination of tax rates and harmonization of tax bases in a way 
that will accord agency to sub-Saharan Africa as it constructs revenue-raising 
strategies that will support a blueprint for emergence from the pandemic.  
III. CONCLUSION 
The ability of sub-Saharan countries to mobilize sufficient revenue to 
sustain infrastructure and a social network and to achieve economic growth is 
critical to the achievement of the 2030 sustainable development goals to 
which all U.N. members committed in 2015.127  Reconfiguration of the BEPS 
Project to consider the structural problems underlying the international tax 
system by questioning the fundamental principles built into existing regimes 
of high-income countries could have assisted in uncovering impediments to 
achieving these goals.  A multilateral approach to reform, involving 
developing countries in conceiving the project, would have brought 
developing country issues to the forefront. 
A global tax system administered by some form of a World Tax 
Organization held the promise to bring all players to the table in a bid to 
equitably allocate taxing rights among all jurisdictions.  A common corporate 
tax base, like that proposed but not adopted by the European Union, would 
have diminished national borders and afforded the prospect of a cooperative 
approach to international taxation.  The lack of political will for such an 
approach set up the BEPS Project for controversy and, perhaps, ultimate 
rejection of some components.  It  ensured that the significant problems faced 
by sub-Saharan Africa and other developing nations in their bid to mobilize 
adequate revenue to support a sustainable future would  not be adequately 
addressed.  Yet, it is not too late to accord a major role to sub-Saharan Africa 
 
 126. The Made in America Tax Plan, US DEP’T TREASURY 10–12 (Apr. 2021), 
https://home.treasury.gov/system/files/136/MadeInAmericaTaxPlan_Report.pdf.  
 127. Valderrama et al., supra note 47, at 4–5. 
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in the direction of further BEPS reforms.  Recent proposals involving digital 
services tax reforms, particularly the GloBE, if re-envisioned with input from 
that region, hold promise to restore legitimacy to the OECD/G-20-led tax 
reform effort.  Implementation of a number of the other supports 
recommended above may operate to secure the position of sub-Saharan 
Africa, as well as to maximize worldwide welfare. 
 
